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The Brexit Vote: A Financial Thunderclap 
With Long-Term Consequences
By Vassilis Fouskas
Brexit
The Brexit vote was a financial thun-
derclap for the entire Western chain 
of  globalised finance. The EU and 
the Eurozone now face an unknown 
period of  disintegration, instability 
and rebranding.  
Financialisation is a policy and a process that began with the end of  the dollar-gold parity in the 
late 1960s. It unleashed money and 
credit and signalled a shift of  transatlan-
tic economies from the (under-perform-
ing) “real economic sector” to financial 
and banking services which, for ease of  
reference, I would call “fictitious sector”. 
New forms of  trade and profiteering 
emerged with the financialisation of  
non–financial enterprises being followed 
by the financialisation of  everyday life, 
especially through the spectacular rise of  
consumer debt. Britain, under Thatcher, 
and the USA, under Reagan, spread 
financialisation into the domestic envi-
ronment of  the states through a set of  
policies that are commonly referred to as 
“neo–liberalism” (privatisation of  public 
enterprises, welfare state retrenchment, 
flexible labour markets etc.). 
Neo-liberal financialisation preceded 
the process of  European integration 
stritu sensu. The former began in earnest 
in the late 1970s, whereas the origins of  
the latter can be traced back in 1986-87 
with Jacques Delors’ Single European 
Act, leading to the Maastricht Treaty and 
the launch of  the Euro in 1999. In this 
transatlantic configuration, the City of  
London was slated for the role of  an 
offshore stabiliser and facilitator for the 
Eurozone exchange market, sustaining 
the operations of  assets denominated 
in dollars and Euros. It was neo-liberal 
financialisation that laid out the mon-
etary policy framework of  the EU and 
the Eurozone, not vice versa. Dollar, 
sterling and Euro trading assets were and 
are fundamental for the reproduction of  
the Eurozone as a whole and, as a conse-
quence, of  the dominance of  the German 
(low-inflation, low–wage, export-led) 
model in it. Contrary to conventional 
views that see a split between the City 
of  London and Euro–zone economies, I 
argue that both markets are closely inter-
linked and cannot operate as separate or 
antagonistic entities in conditions of  glo-
balised finance. In other words, neo-lib-
eral financialisation has over the last forty 
years consolidated the inter-dependence 
of  continental European and Anglo-
American markets to such a degree that 
the breaking of  any link would have 
severe consequences upon the entire 
chain of  the regime. Yet, the Brexit vote, 
and the Greek crisis before, did exactly 
that. With the Greek debt crisis unre-
solved and with an Italian banking crisis 
looming, the long-term implications of  
the Brexit vote are enormous. 
The global/Eurozone membership 
of the City of London
The EU accounts for almost half  of  
Britain’s exports and imports. This 
corresponds to 15% of  the country's 
GDP. Britain, as part of  the EU, nego-
tiates trade agreements through the EU 
and not as an independent state. This 
is beneficial to Britain because the EU 
is a far larger market than the UK and 
global companies, having UK’s “pass-
porting rights”, can come and settle in 
the UK and use the country as a plat-
form for their EU trade and investment 
operations. The Wall Street itself  is able 
to sell its financial and insurance ser-
vices across the EU’s 28 states without 
having to ask for regulatory approval 
from each one of  them.
It is in this context that Britain, as an 
EU member, receives the highest pro-
portion of  inward FDI and portfolio 
investment. Of  all countries in the world 
only the USA has a higher stock of  FDI. 
This is mainly happening because of  the 
particular role of  the City of  London in 
the structure of  European and global 
markets, namely the role of  the City 
as a trading platform of  financial and 
banking services. More specifically, the 
City has become the biggest centre for 
trading the Euro: it manages one trillion 
Euros of  assets in cross-border funds 
and it dominates the foreign exchange 
market, whose daily turnover is about £4 
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trillion. Foreign investment banks, many 
of  them German and American, over 
????????????????????????????????????????
companies, shadow banking activity, an 
army of  lawyers and accountants, serve 
the single European market and some 
??????????????? ?????????????? ????? ???’s 
employees, come from Europe itself. 
Anglo-European mergers are common. 
????????????????????????????????????
Deutsche Börse (DB) had announced 
plans to merge in order, among others, 
to increase the volume of  clearing trades 
conducted in Euros. Thus, Britain, 
???????? ???? ??????????? ?? ? ???? ?????? ???
essentially an offshore stabiliser and facil-
itator of  the Eurozone by virtue of  its 
global operations and EU membership. 
??????????????????????????????? ????????
???????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????? ??? ??????????????????-
prehensive free trade agreement that is 
under negotiation with the USA. 
Short-term consequences
??????????? ????? ????????? ??????? ????-
cial markets, wiping more than £2,5 
trillion off  global share-price values 
in just over two days. The pound 
collapsed against the dollar and the 
LSE-DB merger was being questioned 
??? ??????????????????????? ????????????????
stripped Britain of  its top AAA credit 
rating and the Governor of  the Bank 
of  England gave assurances that the 
Bank is prepared to pump £250 billion 
????? ???? ????????? ??????? ?? ? ??????? ???
order to calm markets and defeat uncer-
tainty. Oil prices had dropped by 6% 
to below $48 a barrel. Goldman Sachs 
??????????????????????????????????
????????????? ????????????????????????
Stanley tumbled 9%. All US-led com-
panies suffered losses: Apple fell 2,5%; 
Alphabet, Google's holding company, 
lost 3,5% and Microsoft and Yahoo 
?????????????????????????????????????
commercial property market proved 
to be particularly vulnerable. Fearing 
??????????? ?? ? ????????? ???? ???????????
??????£650 million worth of  large-scale 
commercial property ventures were 
???????? ??????? ?? ????? ?? ? ???? ???????
vote. If  uncertainty prevails, this can 
become a more permanent feature 
pushing large number of  sales trans-
acting below book value. This means 
?????????????????????????????????????
assumption that property prices would 
continue to rise will be unable to pay 
off  their debts, transplanting the crisis 
into the banking system.
The global bond market is another 
? ???????? ??????????? ? ?????????????????
With the riskiest assets being sold off, 
????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ??? ????
safety of  bond markets. As a conse-
quence, bond prices went up lowering 
the yields (bond prices and yields move 
in an inverse relationship). The indica-
tor here is the German ten-year Bund 
yield: it dropped into a negative terri-
tory, hitting 0,12%. Only if  this yield 
consolidates into positive territory one 
????????????????????????????? ????????????
vote had somewhat been contained. 
????????????????? ??????????????????????
car manufacturers, budget airlines and 
??????????????? ????? ??? ?????? ??????-
???????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ???????? ?????? ???? ??????-
ment strategy towards Europe. For 
????????? ?????????? ????? ??? ????????
making use of  “passporting rights”, 
have invested heavily in Britain in order 
?????????????????????????????????????
Long-term consequences
The short-to-medium term conse-
???????? ?? ? ???? ??????? ????? ????? ??? ??
certain degree, contingent upon the 
type of  agreement that British and EU 
elites will be in a position to negotiate 
??? ???? ??????? ??????? ??? ????? ?????????
and assuming that politics play a dili-
gent role, short-term negative conse-
quences can be contained. But short-
to-medium term consequences are 
epiphenomena of  deeper underground 
structural trends that emerge clearly if  a 
macro–economic analysis is pursued in 
?????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????
???????????????????????? ????????????????
It was the former that caused the latter 
as it trickled down to the Eurozone’s 
faulty monetary architecture via the 
banking sector.
???? ??????? ????? ???? ??????????
Europe’s banking crisis, made plans 
for a pan-European banking union 
unrealistic and brought the issue of  the 
sovereign debt crisis to the forefront 
via Italy. In addition, it brought to the 
fore the Eurozone’s imbalances and 
asymmetries, especially the surpluses 
GRAPH 1. Current Account Imbalances in the Eurozone (as a share of eurozone GDP)
Source: IMF WEO Database October 2011
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???????????? ??? ???? ???????? ???????? ?????????
???????????????????????????????? ??????????????
periphery, a systemic/structural trend illustrated 
by the graph (see graph 1 on previous page).
Italy's debt/GDP ratio runs at 140% and its 
banks hold more than 350 bn Euros of  unper-
formed loans. Monte dei Paschi di Siena alone, 
the oldest bank in the world and the weakest 
in Italy, is in possession of  a bad loan book of  
£39,9 bn. The bank itself  is valued less than £1 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
to British capital will suffer most. Italy apart, 
these countries are the Netherlands, Belgium, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
areas. Germany will suffer too. Poland, in particu-
????? ???????? ???????? ?????????????????? ???? ????
EU budget. There are almost 750,000 Poles living 
in the UK. This is the single biggest group of  
foreign nationals. Their remittances sent back to 
Poland amount to over £1,1 bn each year. This is 
???????????????????????????????????????????
As demonstrated above, investment and trade 
patterns across the EU and globally are asymmet-
???? ??????????????????????????????????????????
investments worth £180 bn in the UK, earning 
over £9 bn in 2013, which is equivalent to 1,5% 
of  Dutch GDP. Germany has a trade surplus 
with the UK of  over £28 bn. German manufac-
????????????????????£50 bn to the UK, or 2,4% 
of  GDP. Just imagine what is going to happen 
to German industry and the global process of  
???????????????? ?? ? ????????? ???????? ???? ??? ????
forced structurally by asymmetric economic and 
social necessities, pursued an import-substitution, 
protectionist policy. This means that all Japanese 
and German producers will have to relocate, with 
Britain re-building its own manufacturing base 
and steadily adopting a new industrial policy, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
Services will cease to be the backbone of  the 
economy and British SMEs will be demanding 
????? ????????? ????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ????? ???
the British Business Bank. Ceteris paribus, leaving 
the EU will not have an immediate impact on 
??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????-
???????????????? ???????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ? ????? ?????? ???? ???????? ???????? ???????
of  Britain, which is 5% of  its GDP. This means 
that Britain depends on foreign investors. But if  
Britain is outside the EU, foreign investors would 
most certainly ask for a premium, which would be 
passed on as higher interest rates to SMEs.   
Concluding remarks
???????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????? ????????????????????
It unleashed the underground disintegrative 
tendencies of  the Eurozone and undermined 
????????????????????????????? ?????????????????-
cialisation. This is because of  the peculiar role 
?? ???????????? ??????????????????????????????????
???? ???????????? ???? ????? ???? ??????????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
reproduces and facilitates Germany’s economic 
??????????????????????????? ???????? ?????????????
that is, if  the British and the European elites fail 
to strike a deal that restores the status quo ante, 
then Europe’???????????????????????????????????
fragment further, with the EU and the Eurozone 
facing an unknown period of  disintegration, 
instability and rebranding.  
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